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The debate as to the meaning of medical futility and what physicians should do in clinical 
practice dates back to the time of the writings of Hippocrates and Plato where it was said, 
"To attempt futile treatment is to display an ignorance that is allied to madness". In simpler 
times assertions regarding the obvious were sufficient to indicate what was thought "fitting" 
as a medical practitioner. In recent times, however, modern technology, professional values 
and power, patient autonomy, limited health care resources and societal expectations, make 
for a much more potent and potentially explosive mixture. In this article we argue that futility 
is a problem that will not go away, both because of increased health expectations and 
emerging technologies that keep making possible what was previously impossible. The 
problem of definition and its ramifications in terms of institutional policies is one in which the 
legal profession and its process (which often represents and reflects societal values) has a key 
role to play by way of critical reflection and appraisal. 
Introduction 
Physicians and ethicists have long been to describe treatments that fail to provide the patient 
concerned about patients and their surrogates who with worthwhile benefits and is one of the oldest in 
insist on receiving life-sustaining treatment that medical practice. The Hippocratic Corpus, for 
others judge to be medically futile. The concept of example, encouraged physicians to recognise the 
medical futility is often used clinically (but loosely) limits of medicine, "to refuse to treat those who are 
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overmastered by their diseases, realising that in Futility is a problem that will not go away, both 
such cases medicine is powerless".l Christian ethics because of increased health expectations and 
have also recognised the implications of futility because emerging technologies keep making 
determinations by way of the Doctrine of Ordinary possible what was previously impossible. For 
and Extraordinary Means which, it is claimed, example, a number of discussions regarding futility 
offers patients and doctors, regardless of their have focused on the issues of cardiopulmonary 
religious beliefs, a reasonable and straightforward resuscitation and the persistent vegetative state 
basis for determining how much to strive to keep (PVS), framing the debate as a conflict between 
patients alive. In recent years, "futility" has been patient rights or autonomy and physician integrity 
incorporated into numerous biomedical policy regarding who has the right to determine when a 
statements and legislation as justification for medical intervention is inappropriate.7 The much-
physician non-treatment.2 publicised case of Helga Wangile, an elderly patient 
The claim that an intervention is futile is in a persistent vegetative state whose treatment was 
frequently used to justify a shift in the ethical sustained at her husband's insistence in spite of 
obligations owed to a patient. For instance, patients physician and hospital evaluations that continued 
are said to have entitlement or prima facie rights to c a r e was futile, is perhaps the most well-known 
certain sorts of health care, for example, primary example of a continuing debate concerning its 
and emergency care.3 However, where a treatment clinical relevance, ethical implications, and the 
is judged to be futile or useless, a patient is not l i m i t s o f society's obligation to provide continuing 
entitled to it, nor is the clinician under any legal or health care resources, 
ethical obligation to offer it.4 In the recent English 
case of Airedale NHS Trust ν Bland,' Lord Goff of S o m e definitions 
Chieveley said: -j^ e current debate on medical futility seems to 
"[M]edical treatment is [not] appropriate or revolve around two distinct though related areas of 
requisite simply to prolong a patient's life, when concern. First, there is the problem of whether it is 
such treatment has no therapeutic purpose of any possible to define what we mean by the concept of 
kind, as where it is futile because the patient is medical futility and whether we can identify 
unconscious and there is no prospect of any sufficient defining or operational attributes which 
improvement in his condition."6 would assist patient-treatment assessments. The 
In the past few years, however, the concept of s e c o n <i area of concern is the issue of who should 
futility has come under increasing academic, public determine when a treatment is futile and how. 
and professional scrutiny, particularly in relation to The earliest known attempt to define futility 
the ethical implications for professional practice and comes from the Hippocratic Corpus? where what is 
institutional policies and guidelines that flow from now called the quantitative definition was clearly 
determining that a treatment is futile. recognisable.10 Schneiderman has proposed that if a 
treatment has not been successful in the last 100 
cases, then common sense dictates that such a 
1
 Hippocrates, "The Art" in S J Reiser, A J Dyck and W J Curren 
et al, Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and 7 D Callahan, "Necessity, Futility and the Good Society" (1994) 
Contemporary Concerns (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1977), 42 (8) Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 866; K R 
P 6. Mitchell, I H Kerridge and T J Lovat, "Medical Futility, 
2
 American Thoracic Society, "Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment Withdrawal and the Persistent Vegetative State" 
Life-sustaining Therapy" (1991) 115 Annals of Internal (1993) 19 Journal of Medical Ethics 71; L J Schneiderman, 
Medicine 478. "The Futility Debate: Effective Versus Beneficial Intervention" 
3
 T L Beauchamp and J F Childress, Principles of Biomedical (1994) 42 (8) Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 883. 
Ethics (4th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994). 8 S H Miles, "Informed Demand for 4Non-beneficiaT Medical 
4
 J D Lantos, "Futility Assessments and the Doctor-patient Treatment" (1991) 325 New England Journal of Medicine 512. 
Relationship" (1994) 42 (8) Journal of the American Geriatrics 9 Op cit η 1. 
Society 868. 1 0 L J Schneiderman, N S Jecker and A R Jonsen, "Medical 
5
 [1993] AC 789. Futility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications" (1990) 112 
6
 Ibid at 869 (emphasis added). Annals of Internal Medicine 949. 
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treatment should be regarded as quantitatively one end of a spectrum of therapies of variable 
futile.11 On the other hand, Plato had a qualitative efficacy and where benefit becomes infinitely small 
perspective of futility which emphasised the before it becomes negative. Clinical uncertainty is 
inappropriateness of persisting with treatment which the norm rather than the exception, 
leaves the surviving patient with a "useless" life: The second problem relates to the nature of 
"medicine was not intended for them and they empirical or statistical interpretations of medical 
should not be treated even if they were richer benefit. Clinically, it may not be possible to define 
than Midas."12 futile treatment on the basis of a statistical threshold 
Qualitatively, a futile treatment is one which does as there may be insufficient data to make accurate 
not achieve its desired goals and is said to be prognostications. Expressions of probability may 
inconsistent with the "ends" of medicine. In also mean different things to different physicians or 
general, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of to individual patients. For example, some may 
medical futility may be seen as conceptual invoke futility if the success rate is 0 per cent 
umbrellas under which clinical contributions to the whereas others may invoke futility for treatment 
debate can be placed.13 with a success rate as high as 10 per cent. Indeed, it 
~
 K 1 has been suggested that medical science may be 
fcome problems sufficiently imprecise to allow accurate 
In recent times, the problems associated with determinations of futility,14 given that a number of 
defining futility have encompassed patient rights studies have demonstrated the limitations of 
and speculations about the limits of patient physicians' clinical estimation of both diagnosis15 
autonomy, economics, professional integrity and the and prognosis. 
role of the physician in the physician-patient The problems associated with reaching 
relationship, as well as the lack of shared values as agreement regarding the meaning of qualitative 
to what may be regarded as medically necessary in futility are more formidable and include: 
a particular case. More specifically, there are two · disagreements about the goals of therapy, and 
problems associated with Schneiderman's proposed * e ends of medicine; 
definition of quantitative futility. The first problem
 # w h o s e v a l u e s s h o u l d determine decision-
arises from the nature of clinical uncertainty and making* 
the language of probability. Most medical situations 
are characterised by uncertainty and seldom is there · t h e limits of patient autonomy; and 
room for absolutes such as never or always. Indeed,
 # professional integrity, 
most judgments are a matter of probability rather 
than certainty, where futile treatment may represent Values and goals of therapy 
It is clear that statistical probability alone cannot 
11
 L J Schneiderman, K Faber-Langendoen and N S Jecker, be the sole determinant o f futility. Many 
"Beyond Futility to an Ethics of Care" (1994) 96 American determinations of futility embody assessment of the 
lïZ""1 fVêgfebft l I i goals of therapy and there can be no doubt that such 
12
 Plato, 7Ae Republic (G M Grube, trans, Hackett Publishing, & * Ì * · *-: · n ι 
Indianapolis, 1981), ρ 76. assessments of outcome are intrinsically value-
13
 G E Taffet, T A Teasdale and R J Leichi, "In-hospital 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation" (1988) 260 Journal of the 
American Medical Association 2069; J D Lantos, P A Singer 
and R M Walker et al, "The Illusion of Futility in Clinical 1 4 A S Brett, "Hidden Ethical Issues in Clinical Decision 
Practice" (1989) 87 American Journal of Medicine 81; Analysis" (1981)305 Ne w England Journal of Medicine 1150. 
L J Schneiderman and R G Spragg, "Ethical Decisions in 1 5 R M Poses, R D Cebul, M Collins and S S Fager, "The 
Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation" (1988) 381 New Accuracy of Experienced Physicians* Probability Estimates for 
England Journal of Medicine 984; L J Blackhall, "Must We Patients with Sore Throats: Implications of Decision-making" 
Always Use CPR?" (1987) 317 New England Journal of (1985)254 Journal of the American Medical Association 925. 
Medicine 1281 ; A S Brett and L B McCullough, "When Patients 1 6 R M Poses, C Bekes, F J Copare and W E Scott, "The Answer 
Request Specific Interventions: Defining the Limits of the to 'What are My Chances, Doctor?' Depends on Whom is 
Physician's Obligation" (1986) 315 New England Journal of Asked: Prognostic Disagreement and Inaccuracy for Critically 
Medicine 1347. Ill Patients" (1989) 17 Critical Care Medicine 827. 
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laden.17 For example, the minutest prospect of Effects, benefits and burdens: Who 
surviving for a few days, or even hours, may be decides? 
valued by a patient with a terminal malignancy ,. . . - ... ,. ... ,, .. 
, , · u ·•· ι •· > · η The qua itative aspect of futility highlights the 
(who is perhaps awaiting a relative s arrival), even M . , . ^ „ j ¿ r * \ • · · • , • _ • · j A ASI u Λ. need to weigh and compare the expected effects, if continuing treatment is deemed futile by the 6 ^ ,
 f , » Λ.. Λ. 
u
 · · ou J J I i · outcome benefits and burdens that might come from 
physician. Schneiderman and colleagues recognise *""wmv y © 
fu ι ι J • Í· u j · · u *u medical intervention and raises the issue of who it is 
the value-laden aspect of such decisions when they ""**«*" . , , . . , . . . .. , 
r
 who should decide whether such medical 
intervention is futile. The provision of medical 
"Exceptions could well be made out of l**"** s h o u , d u a ' w a ? s . to ?ub-¡fCt t 0 e t h i c a l 
compassion for the patient with terminal reflection as to whether .t ,s medically necessary or 
metastatic cancer who requests resuscitation in m e d i c a l ,y «***_ °" e o f m e more, T J T ? 
the event of cardiac arrest to survive long enough determining whether a medical treatment .s 
Λ
 u^  , . . * .
 Λ
 obligatory or optiona is to consider its expected 
to see a son or daughter who has not yet arrived 6 J F , ^ . u J 21 τ? 
Λ. *. , , : . c u •· effects and outcome, benefits and burdens/1 For 
from afar to pay last respects. Such an exception *"^» «"*
 t
 y
 t 
υ ι u · ss Λ • c ·!·• * j example, it is c ear tfiat, when one lncoφorates 
could also be justified to facilitate coping and F ' ! . . . j· 
• · u c ·ι u ι *u *· • outcome assessments in decisions regarding 
grieving by family members, a goal the patient VUU.VUM, « © © 
might support 18 treatment, one considers both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria such as: 
τ? ^u u ·* · J·«- u * · the duration of medical benefit; 
Furthermore, even where it is difficult to u«uuiouwiW , 
quantify any form of outcome, as with, for instance, * t h e »kehhood of med.cal benefit; 
continuing enteral nutrition for a patient in a ' the quality of'benefit; and 
·* • * *· *u *·ιι u · the value of the benefit to the patient, 
persistent vegetative state, therapy may still be
 t
 κ
 - ,
 Λ
 . 
ι J r ·• •· ι U i - I ui · As we have noted, there are fundamental 
valued for its emotional, psychological or symbolic Λ 5 . ' ., .. . _ . 
importance to patients' families or society." difficulties m attempting to identify benefit merely 
Finally, it has been noted that estimates of statistical o n t h e b a s i s o f P o t e f a , ' y Φ » * « * f a*°' s SUCJ 
probability do not constitute sufficient determinants ω s u r v i v a l t u n e · Some would argue th* such 
of success or futility, because they do not take into d e c i s i o n s 0™°Φ°;*'η8,determinations of futility) 
account confounding social or psychological are the domain of the doctor, and indeed there is 
factors. By way of illustration, these factors include a d e 1 u a t e ™d™° t 0 s u p e s t ** ±ls , s Λ β c a s e · 
the consideration of liver transplantation for For example, surgeons do not advocate surgery m 
alcoholic cirrhosis in a patient who continues to Λ β f a c e ° f overwhelming risks of operative 
drink.20 Further problems arise when we examine in mortality;" oncologists do not routinely offer 
more detail the ethical ramifications of either a chemotherapy to cachectic, semi-conscious patiente 
physician judging a treatment to be futile on the w i t h w i d e , y disseminated malignancy; and 
basis of professional values, or a patient (or ¡"tensivists do not continue endless ventilation for 
surrogate) demanding treatment for which the patiente with hypercapneic respiratory failure and 
likelihood of an overall benefit to the patient is c h r o n i c a irway s Imitation Indeed, from a legal 
m m i m a l perspective, the question of futility is regarded as an 
issue of medical fact. In Bland,23 Lord Goff of 
Chieveley said: 
" Callahan, op cit η 7; Lantos, op cit η 4; H Brody, "The — — 
Physician's Role in Determining Futility" (1994) 42 (8) Journal " K R Mitchell, I H Kerridge and T J Lovat, Bioethical and 
of the American Geriatrics Society 873. Clinical Ethics for Health Care Professionals (2nd ed, Social 
" Schneiderman et al, op cit η IO. Science Press,Wentworth Falls, 1996). 
" Mitchell et al, op cit η 7. " K Faber-Langendoen, "Resuscitation of Patients with 2 0
 C E Atterbury, "The Alcoholic in the Lifeboat. Should Metastatic Cancer: Is Tra sient Benefi  Still Futile?" (1991) 151Drinkers b  Candida es for Liver Transplantation?" (1986) 8 Archives of Inter al Medicine 235. Journal of Clinical Ga tr enterology 1. 2 3 [1993] A  789 at 871. 238 JOURNAL OF LAW AND MEDICINE — Volume 4 
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"The truth is that, in the course of their work, futility runs the risk of "giving opinions disguised 
doctors frequently have to make decisions which as data".27 
may affect the continued survival of their There are a number of other difficulties in the 
patients, and are in reality far more experienced assumption that assessments of outcome, benefits or 
in matters of this kind than are the judges. It is burdens are solely the domain of the medical 
nevertheless the function of the judges to state practitioner. 
the legal principles upon which the lawfulness of . physicians and other health care professionals 
the actions of doctors depend; but in the end the
 h a v e b e e n s h o w n t 0 be poor judges of patients' 
decisions to be made in individual cases must preferences regarding treatment.28 
rest with the doctors themselves."
 # ^ ^ i s m o s t ììke\y a fondamental 
The decision to withhold a futile treatment does not inappropriateness in making judgments 
mean that the physician should avoid discussion regarding the quality of the life of others and 
about this with the patient. The decision not to
 b a s i n g treatment on that. Indeed, different 
provide admission to intensive care for intubation patients, different people, different doctors, 
and ventilation is an instance of where the
 m a y have differing standards or criteria by 
physician, dependent on the patient's competence which they judge their own quality of life.29 
and state of mind, should discuss with the patient or
 0 n , u , . .^ . ,. . „ χ.
 n
 «•:<„,•>„ 
^4, , i _ _ _ _ . „ · So-called "objective indicators of a patient s surrogate the reasons why such treatment will not ..^ ~ ,.;J , , . . „ i ^ Ä 
. ° . , ,
 J
 quality of life have been shown to correlate 
L ' - . u i j * poorly with patients' assessments of their own The problem with making determinations of , ^ u- *· ι •· ^ *u ;-
 Λ
..,„ A •·!••. ι a. . r ^ u - goals and subjective evaluation of their own futility purely the prerogative of the physician is ? . ..,
 f r f 3 0 
•u* * / . u r-A J u J lives and quality of life, that assessments of outcomes, benefits and burdens 
incorporate and reflect the values, concerns and # Q u a , i t y o f l i f e judgments, when made on an 
perspective of the individual making the "objective" or "medical" basis, may often in fact 
assessment. We are entitled to examine the incorporate utilitarian or social value 
relevance of values inherent in the determination of judgments. 
both quantitative and qualitative futility.24 In Professional integrity and the limits of 
quantitative futility, the value judgment rests in the . 
meaning and value of the probability. In qualitative Patent autonomy 
futility the value judgment rests in the meaning and It is now clearly established in ethics and in law 
value of continued life, and determining what is a that a competent patient has the right to choose or 
good outcome is dependent only in part on what is refuse medical treatment. This is not problematic 
medically good for the patient.25 In other words, where a patient's request coincides with clinical 
even though a doctor may regard treatment as futile judgment, but incites controversy where a patient's 
relative to medical goals, the patient may value request conflicts with clinical judgments of medical 
treatment and the potential benefits of treatment, as appropriateness. Some would argue that in such 
enormously good from their own perspective, and cases patients retain the right to choose treatment 
taking into account their own goals.26 As Youngner 
notes, a decision that treatment is futile or that 
c u i » g « * „ „o, worth p„,s
u i „ g m , y ,eflec, . ^ S ^ X ^ S T ^ ' " ™ 
conflict of values and that to use the language of »
 M D a n i s > D L Patrick, L I Southerland and M L Green, 
"Patients' and Families' Preferences for Medical Intensive Care" 
—
 ( 1988) 260 Journal of the American Medical Association 797. 
2 4
 R A Pearlman, "Medical Futility: Where do We Go from 2 9 T A Shragg and T E Albertson, "Moral, Ethical and Legal 
Here?" (1994) 42 (8) Journal of the American Geriatrics Society Dilemmas in the Intensive Care Unit" (1984) 12 Critical Care 
904. Medicine 62. 
2 5
 R M Veatch, "Why Physicians Cannot Determine if Care is M R W Evans, D L Manninen and L P Garrison et al, "The 
Futile" (1994) 42 (8) Journal of the American Geriatrics Society Quality of Life of Patients with End-stage Renal Disease" 
871. (1985) 312 New England Journal of Medicine 553. 
2 6
 N S Jecker and R A Pearlman, "Medical Futility: Who 3 I J L Nelson, "Families and Futility" (1994) 42 (8) Journal of 
Decides?" ( 1992) 152 Archives of Internal Medicine 1140. the American Geriatrics Society 879. 
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and doctors are obliged to provide it, whereas others violate the physician's duty to benefit and not harm 
deny that patients have the right to demand the patient.36 
treatment that is useless or rationed on the basis of , , . . , . , , , 
scarce medical resources.32 Legal judgment has Shared decisionmaking: balancing values 
generally reinforced the notion that a doctor is and qualitative futility 
under no obligation to offer treatment that is "futile" Much of the ambiguity and conflict associated 
or not "medically indicated". Kennedy and Grubb,33 with determinations of qualitative futility can be 
commenting on Re J (A Minor),34 noted that, reduced by ensuring that the patient is both 
although patients can refuse treatment and absolve informed and involved interactively in the decision-
the physician from the duty to provide appropriate making process throughout the health-care period. 
treatment, the patient cannot demand a form of care We propose that progress towards ethical 
which the doctor, determinations of futility will best take place within 
"in the exercise of reasonable medical judgment
 a
 model of shared decision-making that recognises 
determines is futile, in that it will be of no both technological criteria, probability assessment 
benefit of any kind to the patient. As in all cases and clinical practice on the one hand, and 
where a doctor has formed a reasonable and intrinsically value-laden and patient-centred aspects 
responsible clinical judgment that treatment is
 0 f medicine on the other.
37
 Despite the continuing 
not called for, the law will not second-guess him ambiguities associated with qualitative definitions 
by ordering him to provide the treatment." of futility and the subjective nature of outcome 
Dix et al make a similar point: assessment, some physicians still ignore the role 
"The law does not require that all possible steps that should be played by the wishes and values of 
be taken [to preserve a patient's life]. Not the patient. What should be obvious is the need for 
surprisingly, there are no case authorities directly the patient (or surrogate) to be informed so that the 
in point."35 autonomy and interests of the patient can help guide 
Even if one rejects the notion of futility, clinical management. 
however, this does not imply that patients should The benefits of shared decision-making are that 
have unrestricted access to medical therapy or it may: 
medical interventions. Nor does it imply that it is · promote open and honest discussions between 
necessary to abandon the use of outcome research patients and physicians and will assist in 
or clinical epidemiology as tools to identify clinical clarifying (a) the relevant values, beliefs and 
success and failure. It is clear that autonomy cannot concerns that relate to clinical management; and 
function in isolation from other important moral (b) the goals of treatment, including the relative 
values. For example, if respect for autonomy was importance of curative, palliative or 
absolute, then one could argue that a competent rehabilitative care;38 
patient's choice would always determine clinical · improve communication and decision-making 
management. Yet this is clearly not the case. where inadequate information disclosure, or 
Physicians are not legally or ethically obliged to deficient physician-patient interaction, has 
provide useless treatments such as, for example, contributed to unrealistic expectations or 
antibiotics for the common cold. Physicians are requests;39 and 
entitled to refuse such treatments as they are not 
only inconsistent with the duty of care but may also 36
 B r o d y o p c i t n 1 7 
3 7 1 H Kerridge and K R Mitchell, "Missing the Point: Rogers ν 
— — Whitaker and the Ethical Ideal of Informed and Shared 
32
 Callahan, op cit η 7; Mitchell et al, op cit η 7; Schneiderman, Decision-making" (1994) 1 (4) JLM 239; M Siegler, "Searching 
op cit η 7. for Moral Certainty in Medicine: A Proposal for a New Model 
33
 I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law: Text With Materials of the Doctor-patient Encounter" (1981) 57 Bulletin of New 
(2nd ed, Butterworths, London, 1994). York Academy of Medicine 56. 
34
 [1992] 4 All ER 614. «
 N s J e c k e r ^0 j D S c | f "Separating Care and Cure: An 35
 A Dix, M Errington, K Nicholson and R Powe, Law for the Analysis of Historical and Contemporary Images of Nursing and 
Medical Profession in Australia (2nd ed, Heineman, Sydney, Medicine" (1991) 16 Journal of Medical Philosophy 285. 
1996). "Ibid. 
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• ensure that the clinical encounter will take into morally optional.44 One of the more usual ways of 
account the perspectives of both physician and determining whether a medical treatment is 
patient regarding their understanding of disease obligatory or optional is to consider its expected 
and its impact. effects, benefits and burdens. For example, in the 
~ . . . ^. ^ . . .. , . . . case of PVS, doctors may argue that artificial 
Clinical practice: Guidelines and policies
 n u t r i t i o n ^ hydration is effective in a limited 
We now return to the two "principles" with sense, as alimentation or nutritional support 
which we began this article. It is likely that the intended to achieve carefully defined physiological 
medical profession, together with ethicists, lawyers objectives or goals. As a physiological intervention, 
and others, will eventually elucidate parameters of alimentation is a medical treatment and can be 
medical benefit or a socially acceptable definition effective in keeping PVS patients alive for years. 
oi quantitative futility. It will then be important for B u t w h a t beneflt d o e s t h e P V S Pa t i e n t d e r i v e from 
the medical and legal professions - the latter often continued existence? Nutritional support can 
reflecting and representing societal values - to effectively preserve multiple-organ systems in a 
establish standards of care and a uniform standard p v s patient, but it cannot restore that patient to a 
of clinical practice in order to limit variability conscious, reflective life. Though alimentary 
between physicians and across both medical support is generally of no great burden to the PVS 
specialities and target populations.40 Clinical trials patient, we may well ask whether it is qualitatively 
may well indicate that the best estimate of what will ^ e , especially since the patient remains totally 
constitute quantitative futility will be any treatment dependent on medical care. It may be argued that it 
which has less than a 1 per cent chance of restoring ¡s qualitatively futile because the ultimate goal of 
health.41 The restoration of health means, in this any medical intervention should be improvement of 
context, a return to either the pre-presentation level ^e patient's prognosis, comfort, well-being or 
of functioning, or to a lower level of functioning general state of health. Alimentation, though it 
that is still seen by the patient as sufficient to make produces certain positive and measurable 
life worth living. physiological effects, does not, in the case of the 
PVS patient, ultimately result in either short- or 
Ethical obligations and options long-term benefits of the kind consistent with our 
The goals of medicine may still be a matter of humanity.45 
debate but we believe that in the 20 years since
 T f c e f o r w a r d 
Quinlan42 an ethical consensus has begun to emerge ^ 
regarding limiting treatment to cases where the The way forward is clearly through continuing 
patient, as a whole, benefits from its application. discussion as to the meaning of medical futility, the 
The debates regarding the ethical obligations owed determination of acceptable criteria of quantitative 
to PVS patients like Karen Quinlan have led to a futility and the decision-making process in those 
clearer distinction between treatment which is cases where issues of qualitative futility arise. 
medically futile and treatment which should not be Further discussion on what constitutes futility will 
given because it is expensive and should be rationed necessarily involve a re-examination of medicine's 
and conserved for others who can benefit.43 The existing values and their current extension and 
provision of artificial nutrition and hydration for the expression as health care goals in a time of rapidly 
PVS patient, like other medical treatments (for 
example, the use of antibiotics), is subject to ethical 
reflection as to whether it is morally obligatory or Γ Τ Τ Τ Γ Τ Τ TTTi TTI „
 IT 
J
 ö J 4 4 K R Mitchell and T J Lovat, "Permanently Unconscious 
Patients and the Ethical Controversies Surrounding Artificial 
Nutrition and Hydration. Getting the Facts Straight" (1993) 60 
~~~~~" — Linacre Quarterly 75. 
40
 Pearlman, op cit η 24; Schneiderman, op cit η 7. 4 5 Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of 
41
 Schneiderman et al, op cit η 10. Prolonging Life and Assisting Death, "Withdrawal of Life-
4 2
 Quinlan 70 NJ 10; 355 A 2d 647 (1976). support from Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State" (1991) 
4 3
 Mitchell et al, op cit η 7. 337 Lancet 96. 
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expanding technology.46 The legal profession has a intensive care units, haematology, oncology and 
vital role to play, both during the discussion geriatrics) - can only be ethically justified where all 
regarding the clarification and meaning of futility those potentially affected have been represented in 
and later, in assisting the medical profession and the policy decisions. Health care professionals, 
institutions to standardise clinical practice. As Lord lawyers and society in general cannot avoid the sad 
Goff notes in Bland.41 realities of resource allocation and the central role 
uw ^ , j . j · u* . ^ J Λ of judgments of medical benefit. As noted in Re J 
Mutual understanding between the doctors and
 (
 J
 . .
 4 8 
the judges is the best way to ensure the evolution ' mor). 
of a sensitive and sensible legal framework for "[The order from the lower court] does not 
the treatment and care of patients, with a sound adequately take account of the sad fact of life 
ethical base, in the interests of patients that health authorities may on occasion find that 
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